Domestic Politics and European Integration in Serbia. The Year 2012 and the Paradox of Moderate Nationalism  by Lazea, Dan D.
 Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  183 ( 2015 )  99 – 104 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
ScienceDirect
1877-0428 © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer review under the responsibility of the West University of Timisoara.
doi: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2015.04.851 
 International Workshop on Ideologies, Values and Political Behaviors                           
in Central and Eastern Europe 
Domestic Politics and European Integration in Serbia. The Year 
2012 and the Paradox of Moderate Nationalism 
Dan D. Lazea* 
West University of Timisoara, Bd. Parvan, No. 4, Timisoara, 300223, Romania 
Abstract 
The local, parliamentary and presidential elections that took place in May 2012 and their outcome raised fears in European 
capitals when the leader of the main opposition party, the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), Tomislav Nikolić managed to win the 
second round of balloting with a difference of more than two percent (49.54% / 47.31%). However , in the first round of 
presidential elections the pro-Western candidate, the incumbent President Boris Tadić, had managed to overtake his opponent, 
even if it was a narrow defeat (25.31% / 25.05%), and the polls, as well as some analysts, indicated a relatively secure victory of 
president Tadić in the second round. To understand the outcome of the second round, one has to analyze the political climate in 
Serbia from 2008 to 2012, as well as the changes in the positions of the main actors regarding the main topics of the public 
agenda. 
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The character who has catalyzed the pro-European forces in Serbia over the last ten years has been Boris Tadić. 
Moreover, the final confrontation in the presidential elections in 2012 was a repetition of the 2008 elections, which 
in their turn repeated the elections of 2004, with Tadić and Nikolić dividing the electorate almost in half. The race 
was also very tight in 2008, with Tadić narrowly defeating Nikolić (50.5%). In 2008, more than in 2012, the 
meaning of the popular vote exceeded what was at stake through the designation of the future president of Serbia 
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and represented a barometer of popular support for Serbia's EU accession project.† The two political projects, 
although similar in their general approaches, fueled in fact two trends in the Serbian society. Indeed, both candidates 
expressed their support for Serbia's EU accession, as well as reiterated their position that Serbia should continue to 
consider Kosovo a province within the Serbian sovereign state, according to the Constitution in force since 2006. 
The differences came from Tadić and Nikolić’s divergent views on the conditions of EU accession negotiations, 
in the context in which Kosovo’s declaration of independence, following the failure of negotiations mediated by the 
UN special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari, was imminent. Indeed, on February 17, 2008, Kosovo's independence was 
declared, two weeks after the second round of the presidential elections, with most analysts believing that the 
postponement of this declaration until after the elections was the result of US pressure on Pristina, in an attempt not 
to inflame even more the ongoing campaign and not to increase the chances of winning of the nationalist leader 
Nikolić. 
Therefore, the issue of Kosovo actually made the difference in the two candidates’ approach of the EU accession. 
For Tadić, Serbia’s policy to start accession negotiations should have been based on a pragmatic approach in which 
the two processes – EU accession and solving the Kosovo problem – could have been achieved together: Serbia in 
the EU, Kosovo within Serbia.‡ For Nikolić, solving the issue of Kosovo, according to the Serbian Constitution, 
should have been a prerequisite from Serbia to begin the EU accession process, otherwise Serbia could have been 
conditioned along the way by the EU to recognize its independence in exchange for accepting the accession 
application.  
Between the two rounds of balloting, Tadić received explicit support from the EU when, on January 28, 2008, 
EU gave Serbia a package of political cooperation, including trade and visa liberalization, a pre-agreement to the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement.  
Serbia's political situation is not one that can simply be described by a division between pro and anti-Western 
world, respectively pro and anti-Russian. During the same period between the two rounds of balloting, Tadić was 
not only supported by the EU, but he also received a very strong sign of encouragement from Moscow, when he was 
welcomed there and signed one of the largest privatization contracts in Serbian history. It was the purchase, by 
direct custody and for a price that some analysts considered to be three to four times lower than that which would 
have been obtained through an open tender, of 51% of the Oil Industry of Serbia (NIS) by Gazprom for 400 million 
euros.§  
Nevertheless, Tadić’s victory was hailed by Western governments as a victory of the pro-Western orientation 
against nationalist forces, and Serbia’s endeavour for EU integration therefore received a new impetus. Moreover, 
Tadić 's election in 2008 for a five-year term could have avoided an overlap of parliamentary and presidential 
elections in 2012, and Tadić could have played a decisive role in the formation of a pro-European government in the 
post-election period. His resignation and entry into the election campaign alongside the coalition that included his 
own party (PD), was based on a strategy that proved to be wrong. Indeed, repeating the scenario of the 2004 and 
2008 elections would have been possible if Tadić had succeeded to secure his voters through the same discourse of 
the pro/anti-European cleavage, in which case his direct support in the campaign would have also been transferred to 
the electoral score of his own party. After a campaign marked by the economic crisis rather than by ideological 
disputes, the calculation proved wrong not only for Tadić, but also for the Democratic Party which registered a fall 
of 16 % from 38.4 % in 2008, to 22,11% in 2012 . 
 
Party Coalition Leader % 
Serbian Progressive Party (SNS)  Let’s put Serbia in motion! Tomislav Nikolić 24,04 
 
 
† Julie Ray, ‘Serbians’ Views on EU Membership Key to Vote. Presidential election is seen as a referendum on future path with Europe’, 
available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/103807/Serbians-Views-Membership-Key-Vote.aspx, retrieved on 22.09.2010. 
‡ B92, ‘Tadić: Serbia wants both Kosovo and EU’, available at 
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2008&mm=01&dd=10&nav_id=46814, retrieved on 02.11.2009. 
§ B92, ‘Moscow press: Tadić to profit most from energy deal’, available at 
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2008&mm=01&dd=26&nav_id=47243, retrieved on 03.11.2009. 
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Democratic Party 
(DS)  
Choosing a better life Boris Tadić 22,11 
Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS)  SPS  + PUPS + United Serbia Ivica Dacić 14,53 
Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS)  Voislav Koștunița 7,00 
Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP)  Change Cedomir Jovanović 6,52 
United Regions of Serbia (URS)  Mlagian Dinkić 5,49 
Table 1.1: Results of parliamentary elections in Serbia - May 6, 2012 
What are the differences between the two election campaigns, in 2008 and 2012? First, EU accession along with 
the Kosovo issue have not been the main stake of the campaign. Second, the global economic crisis affected Serbia 
equally, if not even more, than other countries in the region, thus the public debate was focused on concrete 
economic issues: jobs, foreign investment and its impact on the state budget, funding infrastructure projects etc. The 
impact of the economic crisis was so significant that many analysts, in analyzing the election results, saw Tadić as 
its direct victim, while expressing concerns about Nikolić’s new Serbian policy.**  The effect of the global economic 
crisis and especially of the eurozone crisis was felt particularly among the educated members of society and in 
economy sectors directly connected to the European economies, so that the pro-European, urban electorate was hit 
hard by the alarming increase in the unemployment rate in Serbia, including by comparison with the other countries 
in the region. 
 
Figure 1.1 : Change in unemployment rates between 2008 and 2011 (in percentages). Source: World Bank, South East Europe Regular Economic 
Report, 2012. 
 
 
** ‘Serbia's new president revives Balkan tensions’, available at http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/06/04/serbia-new-president-revives-
balkan-tensions/  retrieved on 15.07.2013. 
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Figure 1.2: Unemployment rates in South-East European states. Source: World Bank, South East Europe Regular Economic Report, 2012 
Indeed, focusing the campaign on economic issues was a novelty, but certainly its impact would not have been 
the same had it not been joined together with another extremely sensitive issue for voters: the quasi-generalized 
corruption, especially political corruption. The public perception of the eight years under President Tadić was 
summed up by one of the Serbian political analysts through the expression: Tadić replaced communism with a kind 
of "corruptionism": 
There are many evils in the system. (...) Ex-president Tadić has presided over eight years of poverty, in which his oligarchy have drawn all the 
financial benefits and replaced communism with a kind of corruptionism, which has been very good for them and very bad for everybody else in 
the country.†† 
Under these circumstances, Nikolić led a campaign mostly directed towards economic issues, pledging to fight 
unemployment and raise living standards by attracting foreign investment, as well as to fight the widespread 
corruption of the political class in power in recent years. Therefore, being in a position to choose between a corrupt, 
but pro-European government, and the nationalist alternative, some voters voted for the first variant, in a similar 
scenario to that of 2004 or 2008: 
It’s not much of a choice we’re having: Tadić’s corrupt government or those … nationalists who want to return us to the past. But I had to vote 
for Europe, for the future of my grandchildren. 
The quasi-general sentiment related to the absence of a concrete prospect of Serbia's EU accession could not be 
changed by the European Council decision to grant Serbia candidate status on March 1, 2012. On the one hand, the 
public opinion had begun to show signs of nervousness when, in December 2011, the European Council refused to 
grant Serbia this status, due to Germany's opposition, although Serbia's efforts of cooperation with the ICTY had 
 
 
†† ‘Serbia: Nationalist Nikolic celebrates win, Tadic concedes defeat’, available at http://rt.com/news/serbia-elections-tadic-nikolic-736/, 
retrieved on 23.06.2013. 
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given results, and the last of the accused had been arrested and transferred to the Hague. On the other hand, even the 
decision of the European Council in March was as lacking in concreteness, because the recognition as a candidate 
was disconnected from establishing a concrete date for the actual opening of accession negotiations, a date which 
was to be fixed again, in vague terms, only a year later. Moreover, the basic idea of Tadić's foreign policy, that of 
the possibility of continuing the integration process without having to recognize the sovereignty of Kosovo, was 
strongly contested by a number of statements by European political leaders who explicitly conditioned the accession 
to the recognition.‡‡ 
In conclusion, we can say that a combination of apathy of the pro-European electorate (reflected in a lower 
participation in the voting process) and uncertainty caused by the acute economic crisis, exacerbated by the 
corruption scandals previously mentioned, led to the election results on May 20, the victory of the nationalist 
candidate Tomislav Nikolić. 
Nikolić’s victory and the first weeks after his inauguration rather caused alarmed reactions from Western political 
circles and mass media. It is significant in this respect that his inauguration ceremony as President of Serbia was 
boycotted by regional leaders - representatives of Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia and Macedonia - as a form of protest 
against Nikolić’s repeated provocative statements about Serbia’s recent past, the latest including the denial of the 
Srebrenica genocide and calling ‘Serbian’ the Croatian city of Vukovar.§§  
Regarding Kosovo, Nikolić’s stated view that the issue should be solved as soon as possible, before Serbia would 
have been faced with the decision of choosing EU or Kosovo, generated new suspicions in its turn. One of them was 
fueled by the suspicion of an informal discussion regarding a future partition of Kosovo, in the sense that the Serbs 
in the North of the province were to return in one way or another within Serbia: 
Most definitely Serbia's position will be the partition of Kosovo. This was talked about behind doors, but now with Nikolić in power, he will seek 
partition of Kosovo. Kosovo must respect its interests and review its policy towards Serbia, despite the pressure they might have from Brussels 
not to challenge Nikolić.*** 
Serbia’s relations with the United States and the European Union under President Nikolić seemed insecure, at the 
very least. Regarding the United States, Nikolić’s political past did not recommend him as a credible partner for 
Washington. Indeed, the beginning of his political career dates back to 1991 when, amid ethnic tensions and 
secessionist threats, he founded the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) together with Vojislav Seselj, whose verdict, in the 
trial in which he is accused of ICC for crimes against humanity committed during the conflicts in Croatia (including 
in Vukovar) and Bosnia†††, is expected in October 2013. Throughout the 90s, SRS was the main supporter of the 
nationalist policy of President Milosević, backing or even participating, officially or unofficially, in most 
governments led by the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). 
It was only in September 2008 that Nikolić resigned from SRS, due to disagreements between him and Seselj, the 
most important bone of contention between the two being supporting the project of Serbia's EU accession (Nikolić), 
respectively rejecting it (Seselj). Together with Alexandar Vucić, another important figure of SRS, the two led a 
movement to divide SRS and establish a new party, more moderate compared to Seselj’s ’radicals’, which was 
launched in October 2008 under the name of Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). Despite this break, Nikolić’s entire 
political past seemed connected to the SRS explicit ideology centered around the idea of Great Serbia - sometimes 
against Milosević’s rather pro-Yugoslav ideology - and of fraternal relations that Serbia should maintain with other 
 
 
‡‡  B92, "Recognize Kosovo, then join EU", available at http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-
article.php?yyyy=2011&mm=01&dd=19&nav_id=72218, retrieved on 19.01.2013. 
§§  ‘Balkan neighbours boycott Serbia’s presidential inauguration’, available at http://www.euronews.com/2012/06/11/balkan-neighbours-
boycott-serbias-presidential-inauguration/ , retrieved on 23.06.2013. ‘Regional Boycott Overshadows Serb President's Inauguration’, 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/nikolic-inaugurated-as-serbia-s-new-president, retrieved on 24.06.2013. 
*** Bekim Tahiri, International Relations Professor at the University of Pristina, quoted by SETimes în ‘Nikolić’s victory sparks fears in 
Pristin’, available at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2012/05/22/feature-01, retrieved on  
5.08.2012.  
††† ICTY, ‘The Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Vojislav Seselj. Indictment’, available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/ind/en/ses-
ii030115e.pdf, retrieved on 12.07.2013. 
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Slavic countries like Russia. Moreover, on May 9 (sic!), 2007, about a year and a half before the break with Seselj, 
Nikolić would stand out - in his first speech as the newly elected ’speaker’ of the Serbian Parliament – through a 
very clear anti-Western and pro-Russian message. That is, after a meeting with the Russian ambassador that he had 
the same day, Nikolić pleaded for Serbia’s entry into a state-like structure with Russia and Belarus, meant to counter 
the hegemony of the US and EU.‡‡‡ 
In this context, Serbia's relations with Russia seemed to gain new momentum with Nikolić’s coming to power. 
And this new orientation was confirmed a few days after the victory in the second round of balloting, with the 
occasion of Nikolić’s visit to Moscow and his meeting with President Vladimir Putin, whom he assured that Serbia 
would be Russia's partner in the Balkans and did not intend to seek NATO membership. However, not everyone 
interpreted Nikolić’s behavior in those days as clearly pro-Russian. Indeed, actually his visit to Moscow had been 
planned before the elections and was occasioned by the works of the XII Congress of the United Russia party. 
Freshly resigned as chairman of his party (SNS ) to take office as President of the Republic,  which he had not 
pledged his oath for yet, Nikolić met Putin for a ‘private’ discussion; for the same reasons, Nikolić did not speak at 
the United Russia Party Congress. But maybe all these would not have single-handedly represented a signal, had 
they not been accompanied by a clear statement made by Nikolić during his meeting with Putin: “Serbia is on the 
road toward the EU. It’s a long and uncertain journey. We will organize the country in accordance with the EU 
rules.”§§§ 
What is the political situation in Serbia and Serbia’s foreign policy orientation one year after the 2012 elections? 
Nikolić and the coalition government installed with his support have not confirmed the gloomy predictions of those 
announcing the slowing down, if not stopping altogether, Serbia's European integration process. On the contrary. 
Serbia’s evolution after the political change in 2012 is appreciated by most analysts as positive, and the public 
perception confirms this. If there had been new elections in May 2013, SNS would have obtained a score of 40.4 %, 
compared to 12.6% for DS and 10% for SPS, according to a survey.**** Moreover, in April 2013 SNS became 
member of the political group the European People's Party (EPP), of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe (PACE), and the EPP leader, Luca Volonte, praised the achievements of SNS and the party’s acceptance  in 
EPP.††††. 
 
 
‡‡‡  Radio Free Europe, Serbian Parliament Speaker Calls For Closer Russia Ties’, available at 
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1076353.html, retrieved on 12.07.2013. 
§§§  B92, ‘Nikolić, Putin meet in Moscow’, available at 
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2012&mm=05&dd=26&nav_id=80443, retrieved on 2.06.2012. 
****  Tanjug, ‘La alegerile parlamentare, Partidul Progresist Sârb ar obţine o victorie categorică’, 22.06.2013, available at 
http://www.rtv.co.rs/ro/politic%C4%83/la-alegerile-parlamentare-partidul-progresist-s%C3%A2rb-ar-ob%C5%A3ine-o-victorie-
categoric%C4%83_402426.html, retrieved on 23.06.2013. 
†††† B92, ‘SNS becomes member of European People's Party’,  available at http://www.b92.net/eng/news/comments.php?nav_id=85864, 
retrieved on 15.07.2013. 
